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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate joint information
theoretic secrecy and covert communication in a single-input
multi-output (SIMO) system where a transmitter (Alice) is
communicating with two legitimate users (Bob and Carol).
We consider that an untrusted user and a warden node are
also present in the network attempting to attack the secure
and covert communications to Bob and Carol, respectively.
Specifically, Bob requires secure communications such that his
messages from Alice are not decoded by the untrusted user,
while Carol requires covert communications such that her
messages from Alice are not detected by the warden. To do
so, we consider that Alice transmits Carol’s messages during
selected time slots to hide them from the warden while also
transmitting Bob’s messages in each time slot contentiously. We
formulate an optimization problem with the aim of maximizing
the average rate subject to a covert communication requirement
and a secure communications constraint. Since the proposed
optimization problem is non-convex, we utilize successive convex
approximation to obtain a tractable solution. We consider
practical assumptions that Alice has imperfect knowledge of
the warden’s location and imperfect channel state information
(CSI) of Bob and Carol. Our numerical examples highlight that
the imperfect CSI at Carol has a more detrimental impact on
the average rate compared to imperfect CSI at Bob.
Index Terms— Information theoretic secrecy, covert commu-
nication, power allocation, imperfect CSI.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE security and privacy of wireless communicationsis emerging as a critical consideration for network op-
erators due to the widespread and open nature of wireless
transmissions. Generally, the security protections for wireless
communications have been implemented based on well-known
cryptographic key-based approaches in the higher layers of
the network design [1]. This approach is based on assuming
specific constraints on the computational capacity of a wireless
eavesdropper, such that it cannot discover the secret key
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assigned to the legitimate users to decrypt the confidential
information. Recently, information theoretic secrecy (ITS) has
been introduced as a promising technique for securing wire-
less communication in which no complicated key-exchange
procedures are imposed on the network [2]. In the pioneer-
ing work, Wyner illustrates when an eavesdropper’s channel
is a degraded version of the legitimate user’s channel, the
transmitter and receiver are able to achieve a positive perfect
secrecy rate [3]. Toward this end, several techniques have
been proposed to enhance the ITS: Transmit beamforming [4],
[5], antenna selection [6], [7], cooperative techniques [8], [9],
artificial noise aided transmission [10]– [14], and using power
domain non orthogonal multiple access (PD-NOMA) [15],
[16]. In ITS, the goal is to secure the content of the confidential
message from the eavesdropper. However, in other scenarios
with privacy considerations, the transmitter and receiver aim
to hide the existence of their communications from a warden,
which is the so-called covert communication.
In recent years, researchers have investigated covert com-
munication in various wireless communication scenarios such
as IoT applications [17,18], unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
networks [19,20], cooperative relaying networks [21]- [23],
device-to-device (D2D) communications in 5G [24], and IEEE
802.11 Wi-Fi networks [25]. In [20], covert communication
was considered in the presence of a UAV with location
uncertainty of terrestrial nodes. In [17] and [18] the authors
investigated covert communication in an IoT network and
showed that the presence of interferences from other devices
can be harnessed to support covert communication. In [21], the
authors investigated covert communication in the presence of
an amplify-and-forward relay under the assumption of channel
uncertainty. Greedy relaying was investigated in [22] in which
the relay opportunistically transmits its own information to
the destination covertly besides retransmitting the source’s
message. In [25], a covert jamming attack was investigated
which is an insetting attack in IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs.
The aim of this attack is to destroy the data and defraud the
transmitter by injecting a covert jamming signal [25].
Most previous works have assumed that perfect channel
state information (CSI) is accessible. However, in realistic
scenarios, it is challenging to acquire the CSI of legitimate
nodes without channel estimation error. This is because im-
perfect events like feedback delay, limited training power
and duration, and low-rate feedback [9] impact on the chan-
nel estimation procedure. To this end, the authors in [26]
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2studied covert communications with imperfect knowledge of
the warden’s channel distribution while perfect CSI of the
legitimate user is still available. The idea of employing an
uninformed jammer was proposed in [27], where the source
can transmit data covertly to the destination in the presence
of an adversary. Recently, the authors in [28] studied and
compared the performance of ITS and covert communication
for a single wiretap channel with the aim of maximizing the
secrecy or covert rate.
In this paper, we consider the joint ITS and covert communi-
cation requirements in a single-input multi-output (SIMO) net-
work where two legitimate users (Bob and Carol) request two
different communication scenarios from the transmitter Alice
which is a novel system model and has not been considered
before. Furthermore, we consider that there are two adversary
nodes, an untrusted user and a warden node, present in the
network performing ITS and covert communications attacks,
respectively. In this system model, Bob needs to receive his
message securely, while Carol needs to receive her message
covertly. For secure transmission, our aim is to prevent the
untrusted user from decoding Bob’s message from Alice.
Additionally, for covert communication, our goal is to avoid
the warden from detecting the presence of Carol’s message
from Alice. To achieve this, we consider that Alice transmits
Carol’s messages during selected time slots to hide them
from the warden, while she transmits Bob’s messages in each
time slot contentiously. Different from previous works that
relied on high powered external jammers for interference, our
proposed joint transmission model applies Bob’s data signal
as interference at Willie to support the covert requirements of
Carol, while Carol’s data signal is interference at the untrusted
user to support the ITS requirements of Bob. Based on this
approach, we formulate an optimization problem with the aim
of maximizing the average rate subject to the covert and secure
communication constraints, i.e., preventing the detection of
communications and extraction of data by the warden and
untrusted user, respectively. Since the proposed optimization
problem is non-convex, its solution is intractable. As such,
we adopt successive convex approximation to convexify the
objective function and obtain a tractable solution. We also
consider the practical scenario, where the CSI of the users
and the location of the warden are not perfectly known.
Finally, numerical examples and discussions are provided to
highlight joint ITS and covert design insights. Specifically, we
confirm that the joint secure and covert communications can be
successfully achieved by our proposed transmission scheme.
Furthermore, we observe that the imperfect CSI of Carol has
a more negative impact on the average rate compared to Bob.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the system model shown in Fig. 1, which
consists of one transmitter (Alice), two legitimate users (Carol
and Bob), one untrusted user, and one warden. This untrusted
user and warden scenario may arise in large-scale distributed
systems where the trustworthiness and transparency of all
users in the network is difficult to guarantee and therefore
the transmitter Alice will need to adapt her communications
protocol based on the requirements of the legitimate users and
potential adversary users identified by the network operator.
The distance between Alice and Bob, Alice and Carol, Alice
and untrusted user, and Alice and warden are defined as dab,
dac, dau and daw, respectively. The channel fading coefficients
between Alice and Bob, Alice and Carol, Alice and untrusted
user, Alice and warden are hab, hac, hau and haw, respec-
tively, and these channels have circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We
assume all the channel coefficients remain constant within one
frame and change from one frame to another independently.
Figure 1: System model of joint secure and covert transmission.
Alice transmits confidential messages to Carol and Bob,
where one user (Bob) requires secure communications to
protect against the untrusted user and another user (Carol)
requires covert communications to avoid detection by the
warden. Hence, Alice employs a joint ITS and covert com-
munication approach to transmit data to Bob and Carol,
respectively. In our proposed approach, Alice transmits Carol’s
messages according to a predetermined set of indexes for the
covert communication time slots, while she transmits Bob’s
messages in each data transmission time slot contentiously. In
the considered system model, we assume that Alice knows the
location and CSI of Bob, Carol and the untrusted user whereas
Alice only knows the location of the warden with no CSI
information. This is because we assume the untrusted user is
an active user that knows the codebook of the communication
network to decode the transmissions from Alice whereas the
warden is a passive user that does not participate in any
communications. [27].
We consider a discrete-time channel with Q time slots, each
having a length of n symbols, hence, the transmit signals to
Carol and Bob in one time slot are xc =
[
x1c , x
2
c , ..., x
n
c
]
and
xb =
[
x1b , x
2
b , ..., x
n
b
]
, respectively. Note that Alice transmits
xb continuously while she only transmits xc to Carol during
selected covert communication time slots. In the next section,
we investigate two main cases: 1) Only Carol knows the covert
communication time slot indexes, 2) both Carol and Bob know
the covert communication time slot indexes.
III. PROPOSED JOINT OPTIMIZATION OF ITS AND
COVERT TRANSMISSION RATE
In the covert communication literature, the covert strategy
(index of data transmission slot) is encoded as a secret of
sufficient length to be shared between Alice and Carol [21],
[29], [30], which is unknown to the warden. In this section,
we will first consider that Bob does not know Carol’s covert
strategy i.e., he does not have access to Alice and Carol’s
3pre-shared secret. In the following, we analyze the proposed
system model based on this assumption.
A. Information Theoretic Security Requirement
The received vector at node m (Bob, Carol, untrusted user,
and warden) is given by:
ym =

√
pabhamxb
d
α/2
am
+ Nm, Ψ0,√
pabhamxb
d
α/2
am
+
√
pachamxc
d
α/2
am
+ Nm, Ψ1,
(1)
where pab and pac are Alice’s transmit power for Bob
and Carol, respectively, α is the path-loss exponent, and
Nm ∼ CN
(
0, σ2mIn
)
represents the receiver noise at m.
Here, In represents an n × n identity matrix. Then notation
Ψ0 states that Alice does not transmit a covert signal to
Carol, while Ψ1 states that Alice transmits to Carol. In the
following, we assume the total transmit power is limited by
P , which is a common assumption in the literature [11]–
[13]. Hence, Alice transmits secure and covert messages
(to Bob and Carol) with power pab =
{
ρsP Ψ0
ρcsP Ψ1
and
pac =
{
0 Ψ0
(1− ρcs)P Ψ1 , respectively, where ρs ∈ [0, 1]
and ρcs ∈ [0, 1] are the power allocation factor in Ψ0 and Ψ1
slots, respectively. In order to simplify notations, we define
γc =
P |hac|2
dαacσ
2
c
, γb =
P |hab|2
dαabσ
2
b
, γu =
P |hau|2
dαauσ
2
u
, γw =
P |haw|2
dαawσ
2
w
. The
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise-ratio (SINR) for symbol ` at the untrusted user and Bob
can be written, respectively, as follows
γ`U=

ρsγu, Ψ0,
ρcsγu
1+(1−ρcs)γu , Ψ1,
(2)
γ`B=

ρsγb, Ψ0,
ρcsγb
1+(1−ρcs)γb , Ψ1.
(3)
Therefore, the secrecy rate at Bob is given by
R`sec (ρ) =
[
log2
(
1 + γ`B
)− log2 (1 + γ`U)]+, (4)
where [x]+ is defined as max {x, 0}.
B. Covert Communication Requirement
Based on its received signal power, the warden decides
whether Alice has sent data to Carol or not. If the warden
decides that Alice has sent data to Carol when Alice has not
sent any data to Carol, this means that a false alarm (FA)
with probability of pFAr has occurred. Moreover, if the warden
decides that Alice has not sent data to Carol when Alice
has sent data to Carol, then we say that a missed detection
(MD) with probability of pMDr has occurred. Each symbol of
the received signal at the warden i.e., y`w, has the following
distribution
y`w ∼ CN
(
0, σ2w + =
)
, (5)
where = =

ρsP
dαaw
|haw|2, Ψ0,
ρcsP+(1−ρcs)P
dαaw
|haw|2, Ψ1,
and the proba-
bility density function (PDF) of = is [27]
fΨ (=) =
{
1
ψ0
e−
=
ψ0 , = > 0, Ψ0,
1
ψ1
e−
=
ψ1 , = > 0, Ψ1,
(6)
where ψ0 = ρsPdαaw and ψ1 =
ρcsP+(1−ρcs)P
dαaw
= Pdαaw
. The
received SINR for symbol ` at Carol is given by
γ`C=
{
0, Ψ0,
(1−ρcs)γc
1+ρcsγc
, Ψ1.
(7)
Note that Alice has successfully achieved covert communi-
cation with Carol when the following inequality is satisfied
[27]
for any ε ≥ 0, pMDr + pFAr ≥ 1− ε, as n→∞. (8)
Moreover, the optimal decision rule for minimizing the detec-
tion error at the warden is written as [27]
Yw
n
Ψ1
≷
Ψ0
θ, (9)
where Yw =
n∑`
=1
∣∣y`w∣∣2 is the total received power at the
warden in each time slot and θ is the decision threshold at
the warden. The FA and MD probabilities can be written as
pFAr = P
(
Yw
n
> θ |Ψ0
)
= P
((
σ2w + =
) χ22n
n
> θ |Ψ0
)
,
(10)
pMDr = P
(
Yw
n
< θ |Ψ1
)
= P
((
σ2w + =
) χ22n
n
< θ |Ψ1
)
,
(11)
where χ22n is a chi-squared random variable with 2n degrees
of freedom. According to the Strong Law of Large Numbers
(SLLN), χ
2
2n
n converges to 1, and based on Lebesgue’s Domi-
nated Convergence Theorem [31] we can replace χ
2
2n
n with 1,
when n→∞ . Hence we can rewrite (10) and (11) as follows
pFAr = P
(
σ2w + = > θ |Ψ0
)
, (12)
pMDr = P
(
σ2w + = < θ |Ψ1
)
, (13)
by using distribution of random variable = as explained in (6),
(12) and (13) are calculated as follows
pFAr =
{
e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ0 , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0,
(14)
pMDr =
{
1− e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ1 , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
0, θ − σ2w < 0.
(15)
4By exploiting (14) and (15), pFAr + p
MD
r can be written as
pFAr + p
MD
r =
{
1− e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ1 + e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ0 , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0.
(16)
It is clear that the warden will select a decision threshold
greater than the variance of the received noise, to ensure that
the resulting detection error probability will be less than 1.
C. Optimization Formulation
In this section, to evaluate the proposed system model
we formulate a novel optimization problem at which the
main aim is to maximize the average rate subject to transmit
power limitation, quality of service constraints, and the covert
communication requirement i.e., (8). The secrecy rate at Bob
is given by
R`sec (ρs, ρcs) =
[log2 (1 + ρsγb)− log2 (1 + ρsγu)]+, Ψ0,[
log2
(
1 + ρcsγb1+(1−ρcs)γb
)
− log2
(
1 + ρcsγu1+(1−ρcs)γu
)]+
, Ψ1.
(17)
When Alice transmits a secure message and covert message
to Bob and Carol, respectively, the sum rate in this time slot
is
R = log2
(
1 + (1−ρcs)γc1+ρcsγc
)
+[
log2
(
1 + ρcsγb1+(1−ρcs)γb
)
− log2
(
1 + ρcsγu1+(1−ρcs)γu
)]+
.
(18)
Since Alice does not transmit data to Carol continuously, we
define two parameters r0 and r1, such that r0 = 1− r1. When
Alice only transmits a secure message to Bob, we set r0 =
1. When Alice transmits both a secure message and covert
message, we set r1 = 1. Hence, the sum rate in each time slot
can be expressed as
Rˆ = r0[log2 (1 + ρsγb)− log2 (1 + ρsγu)]+ + r1 [log2 (1+
ρcsγb
1 + (1− ρcs)γb
)
−log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
+
r1log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
. (19)
We assume r1 = 1 and r0 = 1 occur with probability of pr1r
and pr0r , respectively, where p
r0
r + p
r1
r = 1. Consequently, the
average rate in this network can be written as
R¯ = Er0,r1
{
Rˆ
}
=
pr0r [log2 (1 + ρsγb)− log2 (1 + ρsγu)]+ + pr1r [log2 (1+
ρcsγb
1 + (1− ρcs)γb
)
−log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
+ pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
, (20)
where Er0,r1 {.} is the expectation operator with respect to
random variables r0 and r1. In order to maximize the average
rate subject to the power limitation, covert communication
requirement, and secrecy rate constraints, we propose the
following optimization problem
max
ρs,ρcs
R¯ (ρs, ρcs) , (21a)
s.t. : 0 ≤ ρs ≤ 1 (21b)
0 ≤ ρcs ≤ 1 (21c)
pr0r [log2(1 + ρsγb)− log2(1 + ρsγu)]+ (21d)
+ pr1r
[
log2
(
1 +
ρcsγb
1 + (1− ρcs)γb
)
− log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
≥ Rminsec ,
pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
≥ Rmincov . (21e)
min
ϑ
(pMDr + p
FA
r ) ≥ 1− ε. (21f)
Constraints (21d) and (21e) are the secure and covert com-
munication rate requirements, respectively. Constraint (21f) is
the worst case requirement for the covert communication at
Carol.
D. Proposed Optimization Solution
To solve the optimization in (21), we present two lemmas
as follows.
Lemma III.1. The optimal power allocation factor in the Ψ0
slot is equal to one i.e., ρs = 1.
Proof : The secrecy rate which is defined in (17), is an
increasing function with respect to ρs for γb > γu. Hence,
in order to maximize the average rate, Alice should transmit
secure data (xb) with the maximum allowable transmit power
i.e., P in the time slot Ψ0, which leads to ρs = 1. 
Lemma III.2. According to Lemma III.1, the covert commu-
nication requirement is always satisfied.
Proof : When ρs = 1, we have the following equation
ψ0 =
P
dαaw
= ψ1 = ψ, (22)
by substituting (22) into (16) we have
pFAr + p
MD
r =
{
1− e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ + e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0,
=
{
1, θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0, (23)
which satisfies (21f). 
The objective function in (21) is non-concave, therefore,
convex optimization methods cannot be directly applied to
solve the optimization. Hence, we proceed by applying the
5epigraph method [32], such that the optimization problem can
be rewritten as
max
ρcs,η
pr0r [log2 (1 + γb)− log2 (1 + γu)]+ (24a)
+ pr1r η + p
r1
r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
s.t. : (21b), (21c), (21e),
pr0r
[
log2
(
1 + γb
1 + γu
)]+
+ pr1r η ≥ Rminsec , (24b)
log2
(
1 +
ρcsγb
1 + (1− ρcs)γb
)
(24c)
− log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)
≤ η,
η ≥ 0. (24d)
The optimization problem (24) is still non-convex due to
constraints (21e) and (24c) and the objective function. To
tackle this non-convexity, we employ the successive convex
approximation method to approximate the objective function
and constraint (21e) to concave functions and constraint (24c)
to a convex constraint. First we consider the objective function.
which can be re-expressed as
Ξ (ρcs) = Φ (ρcs)− Γ (ρcs) , (25)
where Φ (ρcs) = p
r0
r [log2 (1 + γb)− log2 (1 + γu)]
+pr1r η + p
r1
r log2 (1 + γc) ,
Γ (ρcs) = p
r1
r log2 (1 + ρcsγc) .
(26)
Employing the difference of convex functions (DC) method,
we approximate Γ (ρcs) as
Γ (ρcs) ' Γ˜ (ρcs) = Γ (ρcs (µ− 1)) + (27)
∇Γ (ρcs (µ− 1)) (ρcs − ρcs(µ− 1)) ,
where ∇ is the gradient operator, µ is the iteration number,
and ∇Γ (ρcs (µ− 1)) is calculated as
∇Γ (ρcs (µ− 1)) = p
r1
r
ln 2
γc
1 + ρcs(µ− 1)γc . (28)
Finally, the objective function can be rewritten as Φ (ρcs) −
Γ˜ (ρcs) , which is concave. Similar to the objective function,
we can approximate (21e) and (24c) as T(ρcs)− Λ˜(ρcs) ≥ 0
and Ω˜ (ρcs) − Σ (ρcs) ≤ 0, respectively, where T(ρcs) =
pr1r log2(1 + γc) − Rmincov , Λ(ρcs) = pr1r log2(1 + ρcsγc),
Ω(ρcs) = log2(1 + (1− ρcs)γu), and Σ(ρcs) = log2(1 + (1−
ρcs)γb) + log2(1 + γu)− log2(1 + γb) + η. Moreover, Λ˜ and
Ω˜ can be evaluated similar to (27). Therefore, after applying
the DC approximation, (24) can be rewritten as follows
max
ρcs,η
Φ (ρcs)− Γ˜ (ρcs) , (29)
s.t : (21b), (21c), (24b)
T(ρcs)− Λ˜(ρcs) ≥ 0,
Ω˜ (ρcs)− Σ (ρcs) ≤ 0.
Now, optimization problem (29) is convex and can be solved
using numerical software such as CVX [33]. Moreover, since
Algorithm 1 Iterative Power Allocation Algorithm
1: Initialization: Set µ = 0 (µ is the iteration number) and
initialize to ρcs(0) .
2: Set ρcs = ρcs(µ),
3: Solve (29) and set the result to ρcs(µ+ 1)
4: If |ρcs (µ+ 1)− ρcs (µ)| ≤ ϑ,
stop,
else
set µ = µ+ 1 and go back to step 2.
we use the DC method, we need to employ an iterative
algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1. This algorithm ap-
proaches the optimal solution when the stopping condition,
i.e, |ρcs (µ+ 1)− ρcs (µ)| ≤ ϑ is satisfied, where ϑ is the
stopping threshold.
Remark 1. For the case of γu ≥ γb, it is typically expected
that when the wiretap channel is better than the main channel,
Alice should stop the transmission of secure message. How-
ever, we note that if Alice does not transmit any signal in a time
slot, the covert communication requirement is not satisfied. To
tackle this issue, we propose that Alice transmits an artificial
noise instead of Bob’s data to satisfy the covert communication
requirement. In this case, the average rate in equation (20) can
be rewritten as follows
R¯ = pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
. (30)
As such, the power allocation optimization problem can be
expressed as
max
ρcs
pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
(31)
s.t. : (21b), (21c), (21e).
This optimization problem can be solved similar to the opti-
mization problem in (24) which is skipped for brevity.
E. Special Case: Covert Strategy Known to Carol and Bob
In this subsection, we consider that both Carol and Bob
know the covert strategy i.e., they both have access to Alice’s
pre-shared secret. The pre-shared secret enables Bob and
Carol to know which time slot will be used to transmit the
covert message. In this scenario, assuming that Carol and
Bob share the same transmission bandwidth, we can employ
a PD-NOMA multiple access method in which Bob and
Carol can perform successive interference cancellation (SIC).
By considering SIC, the received SINRs at Bob, Carol and
untrusted user are respectively, given by
γ`B,SIC=

ρsγb, Ψ0,
ρcsγb
1+a(1−ρcs)γb , Ψ1.
(32)
γ`C,SIC=
{
0, Ψ0,
(1−ρcs)γc
1+(1−a)ρcsγc , Ψ1.
(33)
(34)
6where a represents the condition of SIC implementation i.e.,
for |hab|
2
dαab
< |hac|
2
dαac
, we set a = 1 and otherwise, a = 0. In this
case, the average rate can be written as
R¯SIC =
pr0r [log2 (1 + ρsγb)− log2 (1 + ρsγu)]+ + pr1r [log2 (1+
ρcsγb
1 + a(1− ρcs)γb
)
−log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
+ pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + (1− a)ρcsγc
)
. (35)
Therefore, to maximize the average rate subject to the power
limitation, covert requirement, secrecy rate constraints, and
PD-NOMA transmission, we propose the following optimiza-
tion problem
max
ρcs
R¯SIC (ρs, ρcs) , (36a)
s.t. : (21b), (21c) (36b)
pr0r [log2(1 + ρsγb)− log2(1 + ρsγu)]+ (36c)
+ pr1r
[
log2
(
1 +
ρcsγb
1 + a(1− ρcs)γb
)
− log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
≥ Rminsec ,
pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + (1− a)ρcsγc
)
≥ Rmincov . (36d)
min
ϑ
(pMDr + p
FA
r ) ≥ 1− ε. (36e)
In order to solve this optimization problem, we employ the
epigraph method [32] and the DC approximation according
to Subsection III-D to convert it to a convex optimization
problem. Finally, we can solve the convex optimization by
using numerical software such as CVX [33].
IV. PROPOSED OPTIMIZATION WITH IMPERFECT
LOCATION AND CHANNEL STATE INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the more practical scenario
where Alice has imperfect knowledge of the warden’s loca-
tion and users’ CSI due to the passive warden and channel
estimation errors, respectively.
A. Imperfect Information of Warden’s Location
In a practical system, Alice will need to estimate the
distance between herself and the warden, i.e., dˆaw, but this
estimation may have an error defined as edaw = daw −
dˆaw where edaw is the estimation error. We assume that
the distance mismatch lies in a bounded set, i.e., Edaw ={
edaw : |edaw |2 ≤ d
}
, where d is a known constant. In this
case, the summation of the MD and FA probability is given
by:
pFAr + p
MD
r =
 1− e− (
θ−σ2w)
ψˆ1 + e
− (θ−σ
2
w)
ψˆ0 , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0,
(37)
where, ψˆ0 = ρsP(dˆaw+edaw)
α and ψˆ1 = P(dˆaw+edaw)
α . In order
to maximize the average rate in the imperfect information
about warden’s location scenario, we propose the following
optimization problem
max
ρs,ρcs
R¯ (ρs, ρcs) , (38a)
s.t. : (21b), (21c), (21d), (21e),
min
ϑ,edaw
(
pMDr + p
FA
r
) ≥ 1− ε, (38b)
|edaw |2 ≤ d. (38c)
To solve the optimization problem (38), we present the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma IV.1. In our joint ITS and covert system model, the
optimal power allocation is the same with both perfect and
imperfect information of the warden’s location.
Proof : According to Lemma III.1, the optimal power al-
location factor in the slot Ψ0 is equal to one i.e., ρs = 1.
When ρs = 1, we have ψ0 = P(dˆaw+edaw)
α = ψ1 = ψ, hence,
pFAr + p
MD
r can be written as follows
pFAr + p
MD
r =
{
1− e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ + e−
(θ−σ2w)
ψ , θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0,
(39)
=
{
1, θ − σ2w ≥ 0,
1, θ − σ2w < 0, (40)
which (40) satisfies (38b). 
Finally, to solve (38), we employ epigraph and DC methods
similar to Subsection III-D.
B. Imperfect CSI Scenario
In practical systems, Alice may also have imperfect CSI
of the users due to channel estimation errors. Hence, in this
subsection, we assume Alice has imperfect CSI of Bob, Carol
and the untrusted user. Specifically, Alice has an estimated
version of channels [34], [35], i.e., hˆab, hˆac, and hˆau, and the
channel estimation errors are defined as ehab = hab − hˆab,
ehac = hac − hˆac, and ehau = hau − hˆau, respectively.
Based on the worst-case method, the channel mismatches lie
in the bounded set, i.e., Ehab =
{
ehab : |ehab |2 ≤ b
}
, Ehac ={
ehac : |ehac |2 ≤ c
}
, and Ehau =
{
ehau : |ehau |2 ≤ u
}
,
where b, c and u are known constants. Therefore, the
channel gains from Alice to the users are modeled as follows:
|hab|2 =
∣∣∣hˆab + ehab∣∣∣2, |hac|2 = ∣∣∣hˆac + ehac∣∣∣2, (41)
|hau|2 =
∣∣∣hˆau + ehau ∣∣∣2. (42)
In the following, we focus on the worst-case performance, in
which we maximize the average rate for the worst channel
mismatch ehab , ehac , and ehau in the bounded set Ehab ,
Ehac and Ehau , respectively. Hence, the imperfect CSI and
7imperfect information about warden’s location optimization
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
ρs,ρcs
min
ehab ,ehac ,ehau
R¯ (ρs, ρcs) , (43a)
s.t. : (21b), (21c) (43b)
pr0r [log2(1 + ρsγb)− log2(1 + ρsγu)]+ (43c)
+ pr1r
[
log2
(
1 +
ρcsγb
1 + (1− ρcs)γb
)
− log2
(
1 +
ρcsγu
1 + (1− ρcs)γu
)]+
≥ Rminsec ,
pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γc
1 + ρcsγc
)
≥ Rmincov . (43d)
min
ϑ
(
pMDr + p
FA
r
) ≥ 1− ε, (43e)
|ehab |2 ≤ b, (43f)
|ehac |2 ≤ c, (43g)
|ehau |2 ≤ u. (43h)
C. Proposed Optimization Solution
In order to solve (43), we perform the following two steps:
1) Solving the inner minimization and obtain ehab , ehac ,
and ehau , 2) solving the maximization problem according
to Section III-D. The inner minimization is formulated as
follows:
min
ehab ,ehac ,ehau
R¯ (ρs, ρcs) , (44a)
s.t. : (43c), (43d), (43f)− (43h). (44b)
In order to solve this optimization problem, we employ the
worst-case approach. To this end, we employ the triangle
inequality which is defined as follows∣∣∣hˆab∣∣∣2 − b ≤ ∣∣∣hˆab∣∣∣2 − |ehab |2 ≤ ∣∣∣hˆab + ehab ∣∣∣2 ≤∣∣∣hˆab∣∣∣2 + |ehab |2 ≤ ∣∣∣hˆab∣∣∣2 + b. (45)
Likewise, we have this inequality for hac and hau. By em-
ploying these inequalities, we can write the lower bound of
the objective function as
R¯ (ρs, ρcs) ≥ R¯lb (ρs, ρcs) =
pr0r
[
log2
(
1 + ρsγ
lb
b
)− log2 (1 + ρsγubu )]+ + pr1r [log2 (1+
ρcsγ
lb
b
1 + (1− ρcs)γubb
)
−log2
(
1 +
ρcsγ
ub
u
1 + (1− ρcs)γlbu
)]+
+ pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γlbc
1 + ρcsγubc
)
, (46)
where
γlbc =
P |hˆac|2−c
dαacσ
2
c
≤ γc = P |hac|
2
dαacσ
2
c
≤ γubc =
P |hˆac|2+c
dαacσ
2
c
,
γlbb =
P |hˆab|2−b
dαabσ
2
b
≤ γb = P |hab|
2
dαabσ
2
b
≤ γubb =
P |hˆab|2+c
dαabσ
2
b
,
γlbu =
P |hˆau|2−b
dαauσ
2
u
≤ γu = P |hau|
2
dαauσ
2
u
≤ γubu =
P |hˆau|2+u
dαauσ
2
u
.
Finally, the optimization problem (43) can be rewritten
as
max
ρcs
R¯lb (ρs, ρcs) (47a)
s.t. : (21b), (21c) (47b)
pr0r [log2(1 + ρsγ
lb
b )− log2(1 + ρsγubu )]
+
(47c)
+ pr1r
[
log2
(
1 +
ρcsγ
lb
b
1 + (1− ρcs)γubb
)
− log2
(
1 +
ρcsγ
ub
u
1 + (1− ρcs)γlbu
)]+
≥ Rminsec ,
pr1r log2
(
1 +
(1− ρcs)γlbc
1 + ρcsγubc
)
≥ Rmincov . (47d)
min
ϑ
(
pMDr + p
FA
r
) ≥ 1− ε. (47e)
Since (47) is in the same form as (21), we can employ epigraph
method [32] and DC approximation similar to Subsection III-D
to convert (47) to a convex problem that can be solved using
CVX.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the
performance of our proposed system model and optimization
solution. In the simulations, we assume that Bob requires a
higher minimum data rate compared to Carol since the covert
requirement typically assumes a low data rate user. If both
Bob and Carol require high data rate transmissions, further
security strategies such as beamforming [36] may be employed
at Alice. In the numerical results, the considered simulation
parameters are listed in Table I.
Table I: Simulation setting
1−ε Lower bound of detection errorprobability at warden 0.9
dau
Distance between Alice and un-
trusted user 5 meters (m)
daw
Distance between Alice and war-
den 5 m
α Path-loss exponent 4
Rminsec Minimum ITS requirement of Bob 0.5 bps/Hz
Rmincov
Minimum covert requirement of
Carol 0.1 bps/Hz
pr1r
Probability of data transmission to
Carol 0.5
Fig. 2, illustrates the average rate versus the distance be-
tween Alice and Carol. The figure shows that the distance
between Alice and Carol has a slightly higher impact on the
average rate compared to the distance between Alice and Bob.
For example by decreasing dac from 3 meters (m) to 1 m the
average rate increases on average approximately 39%, while
by decreasing dab from 3 m to 1 m the average rate increases
on average approximately 37%.when the distance between
Alice and Carol is increased, Alice cannot proportionately
increase the transmit power pac, due to the covert commu-
nication requirement to minimize detection by the warden.
Moreover, since Alice transmits data with total available power
i.e., P in the secrecy slots Ψ0, decreasing the distance between
Alice and Bob dab has less effect on the average rate. Since
8we apply the DC method to approximate the optimization
problem (24) to a convex one, it is necessary to compare our
proposed solution with the optimal solution by employing the
exhaustive search method and finding the optimality gap. As
seen in this Fig. 2, the optimality gap is approximately 5%
which highlights the efficiency of our proposed analysis.
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Figure 2: Ergodic average rate vs the distance between Alice and
Carol and P = 3 dB , σ2b = σ
2
c = −33 dB, σ2u = σ2w = −30 dB.
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Figure 3: Ergodic average rate vs P, dac = dab = 5m, σ2u = σ2w =
−30 dB.
Fig. 3 shows the average rate versus the total transmit power.
As seen in this figure, by increasing total transmit power,
the average rate increases. Moreover this figure shows the
impact of the received noise power at Carol on the average
rate is higher than the impact of the received noise power
at Bob on the average rate. Similar to Fig. 2, we see that
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Figure 4: Ergodic average rate vs P , dac = dab = 5m, σ2u = σ2w =
−30 dB.
the covert requirement has a higher impact on the average
rate compared to the ITS requirement due to the constraint on
Alice increasing pac.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the impact of the imperfect CSI
of users on the average rate. We see in the figure that the
imperfect CSI of Carol has a more destructive effect on the
average rate with respect to the other users. This means that
employing a more accurate estimation of Carol’s CSI has
a more positive effective on the network performance. The
reason is that Alice should select a lower transmit power for
Carol’s covert message to conceal the signal in the background
noise, while Bob’s message can be transmitted with a higher
power. These facts highlight the sensitivity of Carol’s channel
estimation error on the achievable rate. Moreover, note that
the imperfect CSI scenario (in all three cases) provides lower
ρcs. This means that the covert transmit power decreases when
the secrecy transmit power increases.
Fig. 5 plots the average rate versus the distance between
Alice and Carol. Moreover, this figure evaluates the impact of
SIC implementation on the average rate for the special case
when both Carol and Bob know the covert strategy. As seen
this figure, when Carol and Bob know which time slot will be
used for the covert message and perform SIC, the average rate
is increased by approximately 5%. As such, the figure shows
that there is a fundamental trade-off between the cost of Bob’s
access to Alice’s pre-shared secret and increase in the average
rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates joint ITS and covert communi-
cation in a SIMO network, where a source communicates
with two legitimate users in the presence of one untrusted
user and a warden. While one of the users requests secure
communication, the other user needs covert communication.
For this system model, we presented an optimization problem
with the aim of maximizing the average rate subject to a
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Figure 5: Ergodic average rate vs the distance between Alice and
Carol and P = 3 dB , σ2b = σ
2
c = −33 dB, σ2u = σ2w = −30 dB.
covert communication requirement and an ITS rate constraint.
To solve the problem, the successive convex approximation
method was adopted to convexify the optimization. We then
considered a practical system where the location of the warden
and the CSIs of users are imperfectly known. Our numerical
examples reveal the impact of network topology and the joint
ITS and covert design on the average rate.
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